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THE THALIDOMIDE TRAGEDY AND THE UNITED STATES
By Kaylee J. Rice
The mid-twentieth century was a uniquely optimistic time. Both
world wars were over, and nations across the globe were starting to gain
their footing once again. Nuclear technology had created a new terror,
but seemingly boundless new potential as well. Just a few decades prior,
the discovery of penicillin and subsequent related antibiotics had greatly
reduced the number of people who died of bacterial diseases. The rest of
the medical world followed suit, with new “wonder drugs” entering the
market every day, promising to fix every imaginable ailment. However,
one of these drugs would be remembered not for the suffering it
alleviated, but for the devastation it caused: thalidomide. Ultimately, the
thalidomide tragedy forced the United States to realize that, although
they had narrowly averted disaster this time, in the future they would not
be so lucky unless they created stricter regulations for drugs.
First, however, it is necessary to understand the history of
thalidomide itself. Thalidomide was first synthesized by a Swedish drug
company in 1954 as a tranquilizer. When they tested it on lab animals,
though, the drug did not appear to have a sedative effect, and so they
discarded it and started over. 1 That same year, a company in West
Germany called Chemie Grunenthal picked it up, hoping to market it as
an anti-convulsant for epileptics. However, they discovered that, while
thalidomide made a poor anti-convulsant, it had a sedative effect on
humans that it did not have on lab animals.2 By 1960, Grunenthal was
selling thalidomide under the name Contergan, and its popularity took
off. Helen Taussig, author for Scientific American, writes that Contergan
was used for almost anything, most notably as an anti-emetic for morning
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sickness and as a tranquilizer to help pregnant women get a good night’s
sleep. 2 Its popularity came largely because of its reputation as a “safe”
tranquilizer—unlike barbiturates, another popular sedative at the time,
doctors in the 1950s and 60s thought that the body did not absorb
thalidomide, meaning it did not carry the risk of accidental overdose or of
being used as a means of suicide, like barbiturates did. 3 Advertisements
for Contergan and other thalidomide-based drugs boasted that it was
“non-toxic” and had “no known toxicity.” 4
But was this “wonder drug” really as harmless as the drug
manufacturers liked to claim? The first indication that something was
not right came during the fall and winter of 1960-1961, when long-time
thalidomide users started to report symptoms of polyneuritis:
specifically, of tingling hands and thumb atrophy. 5 Alarmingly, these
symptoms could take a long time to go away. One doctor, Dr. J.A.
Simpson from Edinburgh, wrote to The British Medical Journal to state
that his patients who experienced polyneuritis due to Thalidomide at the
time of his original letter (published January 28, 1961) were still
experiencing symptoms in November, ten months later. 6 By April, 1961,
these reports were numerous enough that West Germany made Contergan
available by prescription only (it had formerly been an over-the-counter
drug in West Germany, although a prescription was required in all other
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countries where it was for sale). 7 Aside from this seemingly minor
complaint, thalidomide was considered to be completely safe.
Unfortunately for thousands of families, peripheral neuritis
would soon take the backseat to a much more severe and dramatic side
effect. As the spring of 1961 turned into summer, doctors all over
Germany began to notice a disturbing trend: more and more babies were
being born with a condition called phocomelia, a deformity involving
shortening of the long bones of the arms and legs, often creating the
appearance that the patient’s hands and feet are attached directly to their
shoulders or hips. Typically, phocomelia is very rare—there were only
12 recorded cases in West Germany in all of 1959. In contrast, by the
middle of the summer of 1961, hundreds of babies across Germany had
been born with this condition. 8 Doctors everywhere were scrambling to
track down some sort of cause for this sudden outbreak. Two German
physicians, W. Kosenow and R.A. Pfeiffer, frantically studied the
affected babies to see if they could find a common genetic factor, but
they could not. Ultimately, they decided that the problem was caused by
the babies’ mothers being exposed to a teratogen between the third and
sixth weeks of pregnancy, when the arm and leg buds of the fetus are just
beginning to form. 9 Even with this discovery, Kusenow and Pfeiffer
were unable to identify exactly what the teratogen was. A wide variety
of possibilities were suggested, including nuclear fallout. 10
Meanwhile, another German doctor, Widukind Lenz, was
sending out lengthy questionnaires to the parents of affected babies,
asking about any possible cause he could think of. At first, there seemed
to be no common factor. However, when 20% of the patients he
surveyed reported taking Contergan during their pregnancy, Lenz
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realized that he might have found the mysterious teratogen. 11 He sent out
another questionnaire asking specifically about Contergan usage, and this
time 50% of his patients could confirm without a doubt that they had
taken Contergan; apparently, the drug was considered to be so harmless
that they hadn’t even thought of mentioning it on the first survey. 12
Having found a strong association between Contergan and the
sudden phocomelia outbreak, Lenz took immediate action. On
November 15, 1961, he warned Chemie Grunenthal about the correlation
between thalidomide and infant deformities, recommending that they
take it off the market immediately. 13 On November 20, at the annual
pediatricians’ meeting in Dusseldorf, Germany, Lenz announced that he
had discovered an association between a popular drug and the increased
incidence of phocomelia, although he did not name the drug specifically.
However, by the end of the meeting, so many physicians had approached
him to ask if he was talking about Contergan that it was generally known
which drug he meant. 14
Other doctors were slowly but surely coming to the same
realization. On November 27, 1961, an Australian physician, W.G.
McBride, alerted the Australian branch of the British company Distiller’s
Limited that their version of a thalidomide-containing drug (called
Distaval in the U.K.) was associated with birth defects. 15 McBride also
published an article containing his findings in the medical journal The
Lancet, sparking discussion about the drug across the worldwide medical
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community. 16 One day after McBride alerted Distillers Limited of his
findings, Chemie Grunenthal officially removed Contergan from sale in
Germany. 17
For thousands of families, though, this action came too late.
Thalidomide had spread to dozens of different countries under a variety
of names—Contergan in Germany; Distaval in Britain, Australia, and
New Zealand; Softenon in Portugal; Talimol in Canada; and Kevadon in
the United States. 18 Overall, more than 10,000 children in 46 different
countries were born with birth defects resulting from thalidomide, a
condition which would soon come to be known as “the thalidomide
syndrome”. 19
The thalidomide syndrome varied in its intensity. The most
notable symptom was phocomelia, especially of the arms, with the
radius, ulna, and occasionally the humerus being entirely absent. 20
Classic phocomelia cases typically affected only one arm, but in cases
brought on by thalidomide, the damage was nearly always bilateral,
affecting both arms and sometimes the legs as well. If the legs were
affected, deformities of the pelvis and femur often caused the feet to
splay outward as well. 21 Other common symptoms included flattened
noses, facial paralysis, internal deformities, and hemangomia, or
“strawberry-marks” on the face (although these were usually temporary
and harmless). 22 Thankfully, despite these severe physical defects,
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“thalidomide babies,” as they came to be known, were almost always of
normal intelligence. 23 One-third had such severe deformities that they
died soon after birth, but the two-thirds of thalidomide babies who
survived had normal life expectancy. 24
Most baffling to doctors, though, was the seeming lack of
association between the amount of thalidomide taken by the mother and
the severity of the child’s condition. Taussig, writing during the crisis,
states that, “there is apparently no relation between the amount of the
drug ingested and the severity of the malformation. A single dose of 100
milligrams appears to be enough to cause severe phocomelia, yet in other
instances the same doses may produce only a mild abnormality.” 25
Eventually, Lenz came to the realization that this was because of the
limited time in which thalidomide affected the fetus: deformities would
only occur if thalidomide was taken between the 38th and 42nd day of
pregnancy. 26 Therefore, large amounts of thalidomide taken earlier or
later than this limited window would not cause birth defects, while small
amounts taken during this time could result in a severe case of
thalidomide syndrome.
However, one major world power had remarkably few
thalidomide babies: compared to hundreds or thousands of thalidomide
babies born in other countries where thalidomide was for sale, the United
States had only 17 confirmed cases of thalidomide syndrome. 27 It would
be easy to assume that this was because the United States had the most
stringent drug regulation laws, but this wasn’t true. The real reason that
the United States managed to avoid a large-scale thalidomide tragedy
was the tireless work of one woman: Dr. Frances Oldham Kelsey.
23
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Kelsey was born on Vancouver Island, Canada, in 1914. She
was schooled in both Canada and England, showing a strong inclination
toward the sciences from an early age, eventually going on to earn her
PhD in pharmacology from the University of Chicago in 1938. 28 As a
woman in the medical field, she had to deal with many difficulties as her
career advanced. For example, when she applied to the University of
Chicago’s doctorate program (and, simultaneously, for a position as a
research assistant), Dr. Geiling, the program director, addressed her
acceptance letter to “Mr. Oldham.” Rather than correcting him, Kelsey
decided to show up and let him discover his mistake for himself. 29
During her time at the University of Chicago, Kelsey and Geiling
participated in a research program that sought to find a synthetic version
of quinine, an anti-malarial drug. Although they never accomplished this
goal, Kelsey made an interesting discovery: pregnant rabbits were
significantly less able to process quinine than normal rabbits, and
embryonic rabbits were unable to process it at all. 30 Unbeknownst to
Kelsey (or anyone else, for that matter) was the way that this discovery
would later inform the most notable accomplishment of her career:
keeping thalidomide from being sold commercially in the United States.
After graduating from the University of Chicago, Kelsey worked
for the Journal of the American Medical Association (or JAMA for
short) as an editorial assistant. Her job was to confirm the scientific
accuracy of articles submitted to the journal for publication. 31 This led to
a job as a medical examiner at the FDA. Specifically, Kelsey worked for
the branch of the FDA that regulated and approved new drugs. Once an
28
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NDA (New Drug Application) was submitted for approval, three
people—a chemist, a pharmacologist, and a medical officer. As the
medical officer in this process, Kelsey’s job was to determine whether
the studies submitted to prove the drug’s safety were valid or not. 32
Kelsey’s first project in this position came to her desk in September,
1960. It was an application for the sale of a thalidomide-containing drug
called Kevadon, which the William S. Merrell company was hoping to
market in the United States. The FDA gave this to Kelsey as her first job
because they thought it would be an easy approval, given the popularity
other thalidomide-containing drugs already enjoyed in other countries. 33
Looking back, Kelsey would later comment, “As it turned out, it wasn’t
all that easy.” 34
In the 1950s and 60s, the process for approving a new drug was
heavily skewed in favor of the drug companies. First of all, the FDA
could only regulate the safety of a drug, not its efficacy. 35 Therefore, a
drug with no ill effects that did absolutely nothing could claim to be the
cure for all sorts of ills, and there was nothing the FDA could do.
Additionally, if no objections were raised against the new drug, it would
be automatically approved for sale after 60 days, even if no one had
technically approved it. 36 Because of this, most drugs were approved as
long as there were no glaringly obvious side effects. However, this was
not to be the case with Kevadon.
In looking at the Merrell company’s submission, several red
flags appeared to Kelsey. First of all, the clinical studies designed to
32
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prove the drug’s safety were incomplete. Second (and possibly more
concerning), Kelsey realized that “many of the submissions from doctors
(she recognized a few of the names from questionable JAMA papers)
read more like advertising testimonials than well-designed, well-executed
scientific studies.” 37 Because of these flaws, she returned the submission
to the Merrell Company, asking for more information before she could
approve the drug. Meanwhile, she decided to do some extra reading on
thalidomide to see what other medical professionals were saying about
the drug. To her surprise, she read in the British Medical Journal that
with long-term use, it was found to cause peripheral neuritis—a side
effect that William Merrell had not seen as relevant enough to mention in
the submission. 38 This side effect instantly led Kelsey to be suspicious of
Kevadon. As she put it, “the peripheral neuritis did not seem the sort of
side effect that should come from a simple sleeping pill.” 39 When she
addressed the Merrell Company with this concern, Merrell replied that at
least Kevadon was “safer than barbiturates.” 40
From that point on, Kelsey and the Merrell Company were
engaged in an openly antagonistic relationship, with Merrell Company
representatives badgering Kelsey daily, trying to get her to approve
Kevadon, and Kelsey doggedly refusing their application every 60
days. 41 Merrell told Kelsey forthright that they wanted to get the drug on
the market before Christmas, “Because that’s when our best sales are.” 42
As she kept refusing to approve Kevadon, Kelsey also continued to
37
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research its possible effects. Because of her former research on the
effects of quinine on embryonic rabbits, she began to wonder if
thalidomide too was metabolized differently by mothers and their unborn
children. Could it possibly be harmless to adults, but damaging to
fetuses? 43
This war went on for over a year, both sides fighting their battles
60 days at a time. The Merrell Company continued to renew their
application through November, 1961, when the first links between
thalidomide and fetal abnormalities came to light; however, by April,
1962, they knew they had been beaten and withdrew their application for
good. 44 In total, there were 17 thalidomide babies born in the United
States—partially from citizens who had obtained Distaval or Contergan
abroad and partially from the 2.5 million thalidomide tablets that the
Merrell Company had distributed on “an investigational basis.” 45 The
end result was a tragedy, certainly for those families, but the overall
sense in the United States was that a disaster had been narrowly averted.
Lawmakers seemed to realize how close they had come to catastrophe.
In October, 1962, the Kefauver-Harris amendment passed, leading to
stricter FDA regulations on new drugs, as well as regulations about
informed consent for those who took experimental drugs on a trial
basis. 46 Dr. Frances Oldham Kelsey was awarded the President’s Award
for Distinguished Civilian Service, becoming only the second woman
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ever to receive this honor. 47 A year later, she was promoted to the
position of Chief of the Investigational Drug Branch of the FDA; four
years after that, she became the Director of the Office of Scientific
Investigation, a position which she held for 40 more years. 48
The thalidomide tragedy was a sobering check on the unfettered
progress that had marked the medical field ever since the turn of the
century. Soon after 1962, it faded into the background once again, but
for the victims and their families, life would never be the same again.
The rest of the world had changed too, albeit in a less dramatic way.
Instead of looking at drugs as miracles, people became suspicious and
began to wonder exactly what their doctor was prescribing them.
Certainly, life had changed forever for drug companies and the FDA—
following the thalidomide tragedy, drug regulations became stricter than
ever before in an effort to prevent such a disaster from ever happening
again. Ultimately, a drug that had once been hailed as a cure-all became
synonymous with misinformation and distrust. Although the United
States narrowly avoided a full-scale thalidomide tragedy, its drug
regulation policies would always carry the shadow of thalidomide.
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